[agents] Call for Papers: the 2nd Games, Agents and Incentives Workshop (GAIW)@AAMAS 2020
Nicholas Mattei
nsmattei at gmail.com
Wed Jan 8 15:36:31 EST 2020
Date: 9-13th May 2020, Auckland, New Zealand
Webpage: http://www.agent-games-2020.preflib.org/
We invite submissions to the second iteration of the Games, Agents and
Incentives Workshop, co-located with AAMAS 2020.
PAPER SUBMISSION
Authors should submit full papers electronically in PDF format at
https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=gaiw2020
Formatting Guidelines: Please format papers according to the AAMAS 2020
format (author kit). Optionally, one may submit in LNCS format as well
(LaTeX template).
Paper Length: Papers can be at most 8 pages long in AAMAS format, or 12
pages long in LNCS format. Additional pages for may be used for references.
Supplemental material can be appended at the end of the paper. However,
reviewers are instructed to make their evaluations based on the main
submission, and are not obligated to consult the supplemental material.
Multiple Submissions: To widen participation and encourage discussion,
there will be no formal publication of workshop proceedings. We will,
however, post the accepted papers online to the benefit of the participants
to the workshop. Therefore, submission of preliminary work and papers to be
submitted or in preparation for submission to other major venues in the
field are encouraged.
Past Submissions: In order to strike a balance between new work and work
that may have been presented but not widely seen we ask that if authors
want to submit published work they do so non-anonymously and clearly
indicate when and where the work was published. We will only accept work
which has been published in the last calendar year (e.g., IJCAI 2019,
NeurIPS 2019, AAAI 2020, and any conference held after Feb. 2020).
We invite papers on topics of game theory, mechanism design, fair
allocation, computational social choice, and their applications to
multi-agent systems:
Algorithmic mechanism design
Empirical studies of games and agents
Behavioral Game Theory
Bounded rationality
Cake cutting problems
Cooperative Games
Computational social choice
Empirical approaches to social choice
Auctions
Computational advertising
Computational aspects of equilibria
Coalitions, coordination, collective action, and cooperation
Economic aspects of security and privacy
Economic aspects of distributed and network computing
Equilibrium computation
Empirical approaches to electronic markets
Fair allocation of indivisible goods
Incentives in machine learning
Information and attention economics
Learning in games (e.g., solution concepts and equilibria)
Matching and Matching Markets
Market equilibria
Negotiation
Price differentiation and price dynamics
Resource allocation
Social networks
Trading agent design and analysis
Uncertainty in AI and economics
Proceedings Publication: to widen participation and encourage discussion,
there will be no formal publication of workshop proceedings. We will,
however, post the accepted papers online to the benefit of workshop
participants. Therefore, submission of preliminary work and papers to be
submitted or in preparation for submission to other major venues in the
field are encouraged.
IMPORTANT DATES
Submission Deadline: February 16th, 2020
Acceptance Notification: April 1st, 2020
GAIW workshop: May 9-13, 2020 (exact date TBD)
ORGANIZATION
Program Chairs
Haris Aziz (University of New South Wales)
Sofia Ceppi (Prowler.io)
John P Dickerson (University of Maryland)
Omer Lev (Ben-Gurion University)
Nicholas Mattei (Tulane University)
Yair Zick (National University of Singapore)
--
*Nicholas Mattei*
Assistant Professor, Tulane University
nsmattei at tulane.edu | www.nickmattei.net
Stanley Thomas Hall | 402B
+1 504 862 8391
Department of Computer Science
Tulane University
6823 St Charles Ave
New Orleans, LA 70118
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